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최근 하버드대학의 'Ash 민주주의 혁신센터'와 중국 매체 'The China Report'가 발표한 '중국의 전과정 인민민주주의' 보고서를 공유합니다.

 

내용은 크게 3가지 내용을 담고 있습니다. 

우선 충칭 근처의 마을인 민주 촌의 재개발 과정에서 인민 참여가 이루어낸 모범적 사례를 들려줍니다.

두번째, 자국의 정치 거버넌스에 대한 미국, 영국 그리고 중국 국민들의 각자 평가와 입장에 여론조사 결과를 보여줍니다. 이 또한 놀랍습니다.

마지막으로 중국의 정치 거버넌스가 형성된 역사적 배경과 형성과정 그리고 서구 자유민주제에 대한 이론적 비판이 이어집니다. 

이번 보고서는 서구가 일방적으로 중국 정치제도가 권위적 강압체제라고 매도해온 편견에 일대의 대반전을 제공합니다. 솔직히 인민 참여와 지배라는 측면에서 중국사회가 서구에 한참 앞서 있는 느낌입니다.

물론 저는 사회주의 중국체제를 옹호할 생각도 이를 도입하자고 주장할 의도는 전혀 없습니다. 

이미 다른 길로 접어들어 서구식 선거제도와 정당 방식의 자유민주제를 도입한 이상, 이의 한계를 비판하고 국민발안과 소환제를 헌법에 규정하고 우리가 추진하는 추첨식 시민의회 제도를 기초. 광역. 전국단위에 모든 단위에 도입하여 토론과 숙의를 통한 집단지성이 실현되는데 매진하고 노력해야겠지요.

 

이런 과정에서 오늘 소개하는 중국의 전과정 인민민주제의 개념과 실천사례가 모두에게 참조와 도움이 되길 바랍니다.

 

(※아래는 원문의 내용을 기초로 필자가 가독성을 높이기 위해 축약과 편집을 가하였습니다. 영어 원문을 글 뒷부분에 함께 수록하였습니다.) 
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1. 민주 촌 이야기: ‘생활 개선’과 ‘참여 연쇄’가 만든 재개발의 다른 길

 

충칭의 교외 러너 포구에 위치한 작은 마을, ‘민주 촌’은 중국 산업화의 궤적을 오롯이 품은 장소다. 근대 중국의 핵심 군수기업 중 하나였던 국유 충칭건설기계공장(전 한양병기창의 이전·개칭)이 전성기에 수만 명을 고용하며 마을을 키웠고, 붉은 벽돌 아파트와 공장 주거단지는 그 시대의 생활 흔적을 남겼다. 그러나 2009년 공장이 바난구 화시 공업단지로 이전하면서 인구가 줄고 기반시설은 낙후되었으며, 마을은 급격한 쇠퇴의 길로 접어들었다. 행정은 한때 폐쇄와 외부 이주를 검토했지만, 주민 공동체의 역사·정체성·연속성이라는 이유로 ‘종합 재개발’로 방향을 틀었다.

 

 

그 이후의 궤적은 서구 도시들의 전형적인 젠트리피케이션* 사례와 확연히 달랐다. 2021년 착수된 재개발은 ‘민회(courtyard meetings)’라 불린 수백 회의 공개 토론으로 시작됐다. 광장에 모인 주민들은 생활의 어려움과 개별 현안을 제기하고, 설계 변경과 공공서비스 확충에 대한 아이디어를 즉석에서 던졌다. 1953년 도입된 ‘제안 박스’는 디지털 공공제안 시스템으로 확장되어 수천 건의 의견을 수렴했으며, 요즈음은 여론조사 박스와 앱(온라인 숙의 및 공청회 )·콜센터('12345' 서비스 핫라인)와 같이 다양한 채널이 보완됐다.

 

*젠트리피케이션(Gentrification)은 낙후된 구도심 지역에 중산층 이상의 사람들이 유입되면서 지역이 활성화되고 부동산 가치가 상승하는 현상을 뜻한다. 

 

이 과정의 특징은 두 가지다. 첫째, ‘생활 개선’이 핵심 목표였다는 점이다. 직거래 장터는 현대화되고, 공동식당은 노인에게 무료 식사를 제공하며, 하천은 정화되어 아이들이 물가에서 뛰놀 수 있게 되었다. 피트니스 센터, 공연 무대, 카페와 컨테이너 바 같은 생활 인프라가 생겼고, 당(중국공산당) 공개 사무실은 페인트칠부터 이웃 갈등까지 일상 문제에 대한 상담 창구로서 기능했다. 둘째, ‘참여 연쇄’가 설계 전반을 관통했다는 점이다. 계획은 주민 제안 → 행정·당 간부 검토 → 시범 도입 → 재평가·수정의 순환을 돌며 세부가 다져졌다. 결과적으로 외부 자본의 유입으로 원주민이 대거 밀려나기보다, 기존 거주민의 생활 수준을 ‘도시 중산층의 생활표준’으로 끌어올리는 방식이 채택되었다. 중국이 말하는 ‘샤오캉(小康)의 여유’—기본 생계를 충족하고 평안한 삶을 누리는 단계—에 맞춘 재개발의 방향은, 재정비가 곧 배제와 축출로 이어지는 서구의 흔한 패턴을 의도적으로 비껴갔다.

 

민주 촌은 단지 ‘예쁜 동네’로 변신한 사례가 아니다. 이 실험은 ‘전과정 인민민주주의’—정책의 발의·숙의·결정·집행·감독 전 단계에 인민 참여를 엮는 방식—의 풀뿌리 버전을 보여준다. 정책 설계에 주민의 구체 경험이 상시 반영되고, 생활의 물질적 개선이 민주적 정당성의 핵심 척도가 된다는 점이, 이 모델의 실천적인 핵심이다.

 

 

2. 여론으로 보는 민주주의 인식: 미국·영국·중국의 ‘서로 다른 거울’

 

민주주의는 단순히 제도적 설계나 형식적 절차일 뿐만 아니라, 민중이 체감하는 ‘삶의 질’과 ‘국가 신뢰’의 문제다. 최근 발표된 여러 국제 여론조사 결과는 미국, 영국, 중국 세 나라 시민들이 자국의 통치 시스템과 민주주의를 어떻게 인식하고 있는지에 대한 선명한 차이를 드러낸다. 이 데이터들은 중국 인민들이 중앙정부와 지방 정부의 업무에 압도적으로 만족하고 있을 뿐만 아니라, 대다수가 자신들의 정부가 민주적이며 인민을 위해 봉사한다고 생각한다는 놀라운 사실을 보여준다.

 

1) 중국 정부에 대한 압도적인 신뢰: 하버드 애쉬 센터의 보고

 

중국 인민들의 정부 성과에 대한 만족도는 서구의 통념을 뒤집는 수준이다. 하버드 케네디스쿨 애쉬 센터(Ash Center)는 2003년부터 2020년까지 중국 인민의 정부 성과 만족도를 장기간 추적해 온 가장 광범위하고 독립적인 평가를 유지해 왔다.

 

2020년 보고서 <중국 공산당(CCP)의 회복력 이해>에 따르면, 중국 정부에 대한 대중의 지지는 모든 계층에서 광범위하게 나타났다. 중앙정부에 대한 만족도는 2016년께 93%에 달했으며, 지방 정부 역시 82%대의 높은 만족도를 유지하며 시간이 지남에 따라 꾸준히 증가했다.

 

 

특히 주목할 점은, 이 연구의 저자들이 처음에는 중국의 권위주의적 특성이 정통성 위기를 초래할 것이라고 가정했지만, 실제로는 인민 만족도가 꾸준히 증가했음을 기록했다는 사실이다. 더욱이, 경제적으로 불리한 내륙지역의 소외 계층일수록 만족도의 상승폭이 비교적 더 높았다. 이는 중국이 주장하는 '전과정 인민민주주의'의 기능에 대한 생각과도 일치한다. 즉, 물질적 조건의 실질적인 개선에 대한 정부의 대응이 그 정당성의 핵심 메커니즘을 구성한다는 것을 시사한다.

 

이러한 결과는 다른 글로벌 조사에서도 일관되게 나타난다. 아시안 바로미터(Asian Barometer)와 세계가치관조사(WVS)에서는 중국 인민의 정부 신뢰가 글로벌 상위권으로 나타났다. 최근 수치 기준 90% 이상이 '국가정부를 신뢰한다'고 응답했으며, 2018년에는 신뢰도가 95%에 달해 세계 최고 수준 중 하나로 기록되었다.

 

2) 중국인의 자기 인식: '민주주의'와 '공정성'

 

민주주의 인식 지수(Democracy Perception Index, AoD-Latana)의 2024년 결과는 중국 인민이 자국의 시스템을 어떻게 인식하는지를 더욱 구체적으로 보여준다.

 

AoD 조사에 따르면, 중국 응답자의 92%가 민주주의가 중요하다고 답했고, 79%는 자국을 민주주의 국가로 규정했다. 특히 91%는 정부가 엘리트 유권자보다는 광범위한 대중의 이익을 위해 봉사한다고 인식했다. 이러한 수치는 고전적인 자유민주주의 국가인 미국, 프랑스, 영국의 응답자보다 훨씬 앞서 있었다. 미국에서는 약 54%만이 '자국은 실제로 민주주의'라고 믿었으며, 42%만이 '정부가 대다수에게 봉사한다'고 답한 것과 극명하게 대비된다.

 

더 놀라운 점은, AoD 연구가 표현의 자유와 공정한 선거에 대한 인식까지 평가했다는 사실이다.

 

"우리나라의 모든 사람은 정치 및 사회 문제에 대해 자신의 의견을 자유롭게 표현할 수 있다"는 진술에 대해 중국 인민의 18%만이 반대 의사를 표명했다 (미국은 27%).

 

"우리나라의 정치지도자는 자유롭고 공정한 선거를 통해 선출된다"는 진술에 대해 중국 인민의 5%만이 반대 의사를 표명했다 (미국은 27%).

 

또한, 42개국을 대상으로 한 별도의 연구에서 '전반적으로 사회가 공정하고 정당하게 운영된다'는 질문에 대해, 대부분의 국가에서 평균 응답이 '다소 동의하지 않음' 또는 '중립' 범위에 머물렀다. 그러나 평균 응답이 '다소 동의함' 범위에 있는 국가는 중국 하나뿐이었다. 다시 말해서, 중국 사람들은 다른 어떤 국가보다 자신들의 시스템이 공정하고 정당하다고 동의할 가능성이 더 높았다.

 

                             [표1]  민주주의에 대한 인식 수준 비교

 

3) 회의론과 학술적 반박: '전략적 오보'를 넘어서

 

일부 회의론자들은 이러한 결과에 대해 '전략적 오보(Strategic Misreporting)' 가능성을 제기한다. 즉, 정치적 반대 의견을 표명하면 탄압받을 가능성이 높은 체제에 살고 있는 응답자들이 정부에 대한 지지를 과장했을 수 있다는 주장이다.

 

그러나 이러한 비판은 여러 학술적 연구를 통해 반박된다. 연구자들은 전략적 오보를 배제하기 위해 목록 실험(List Experiments) 및 암묵적 연관 검사(Implicit Association Tests, IAT)와 같이 특별히 고안된 방법론을 사용하여 여러 연구를 수행했다. 이 연구들은 중국 인민들이 실제로 정부와 정치경제 체제에 대해 높은 수준의 지지를 가지고 있음을 반복적으로 확인시켜 주었다. 또한, AoD를 포함한 모든 연구에서 정치적 탄압으로 알려진 다른 국가들에서는 낮은 지지율이 발견되었다는 사실은, 중국의 높은 수치가 단순한 공포에 의한 과장이 아님을 시사한다.

 

4) 결론: 민주주의 인식은 '물질적 조건'에 좌우된다

 

이 모든 경험적 결과는 정치적 정당성을 평가하는 데 사용되는 순수한 자유주의적 분석 틀에 근본적인 도전을 제기한다. 여러 독립적인 연구에서 지속적으로 높은 지지율이 기록된 것은 정당성이 절차적 민주주의 형태보다는 대중의 물질적 조건에 대한 정부의 실질적인 반응에서 비롯될 수 있음을 시사한다.

 

중국 응답자들이 높은 수준의 정부 신뢰를 보이는 이유는 대규모 공공사업, 빈곤 감축, 사회 서비스 확충이 일상 삶을 극적으로 바꿔놓았다는 체감이 작동했을 가능성이 크다. 지난 20년 동안 중국 제조업 부문의 임금이 8배나 상승했으며, 중국의 임금은 이제 역내 다른 모든 개발도상국보다 높다(표2 참조). 또한 중국은 현재 개발도상국 중 기대수명이 가장 높은 국가 중 하나이며, 건강 기대수명은 현재 미국보다 4년 이상 더 길다. 이러한 실질적인 성과는 중국 인민들에게 결코 간과될 수 없는 중요한 역사적 변화이다.

 

                                                  [표2] 중국 2001~2024년 GDP 성장률과 임금상승률 비교

 

                                        

반면, 미국과 영국에서는 선거자금, 미디어 구조, 심화되는 경제 불평등이 '형식적 민주주의'에 대한 냉소와 불신을 키워왔다. 이 지점에서 보고서는 조심스러운 결론을 제시한다. 민주주의에 대한 인식은 '형식적 절차'보다 '체감되는 물질적 개선'과 '참여 경로의 실재성'에 좌우되는 경향이 크다. 중국의 사례는 국가권력, 대중, 그리고 경제 발전 간의 관계를 우선시하는 통치 모델이 대중의 지지를 얻는 새로운 정당성 메커니즘을 구축했음을 보여준다.

 

3. 중국 정치 거버넌스의 역사적 형성: ‘대중 노선’에서 ‘전과정’으로

 

중국의 ‘전과정 인민민주주의’는 갑자기 생겨난 제도가 아니다. 보고서는 세 층위의 역사적 연속성을 짚는다.

 

1) 혁명기의 ‘대중 노선’

1930년대 장시(江西) 소비에트부터 중화인민공화국 성립까지, 중국공산당은 대중의 구체적 견해를 ‘수집-정리-재전달’하는 순환을 조직 원리로 삼아왔다. 마오쩌둥의 “대중으로부터 나와, 대중에게로”라는 표현은, 현장의 문제 인식을 정책화하고 다시 현장 실천으로 검증하는 변증법적 과정의 요약이다. 토지개혁, 여성 권리, 집단화 등 굵직한 변혁이 협의와 실천의 반복 속에서 다듬어졌다는 기록(윌리엄 힌튼의 롱보우 연구 등)이 이어진다.

 

2) 다당 협의 구조의 제도화

중국은 일당독재라는 서구의 단순화된 이미지와는 달리, 공산당과 8개 민주당이 병존하는 협의체계를 갖는다. 전인대(NPC)와 정협(CPPCC, 정치협상회의)은 풀뿌리에서 수렴된 의견을 제도적 수준으로 끌어올리는 ‘정책 협의 플랫폼’으로 기능한다. 지방정부가 재정 집행의 대부분을 담당하는 고도의 분권 구조 속에서, 촌·향·현·시·성 단위의 선거·협의·공청회·전문위원회·민원 핫라인(‘12345’)이 참여 통로를 촘촘히 메운다.

 

 

3) ‘전과정’ 개념의 명시화

시진핑 주석은 2014년 CPPCC(전국정치협상회의) 연설에서 중국 사회주의 민주주의의 ‘협의적(協議的)’ 요소를 강조하며, ‘전과정 인민민주주의’라는 개념을 공식화했다. 이는 선거 순간의 참여를 넘어 정책의 발의-숙의-결정-집행-감독 전반에 대중 참여를 구축하는 것을 목표로 한다. 민법 제정(2020년) 당시 42만 5천 명으로부터 백만 건 이상의 의견을 수렴했고, 내년부터 실시되는 제15차 5개년 계획 협의에서는 300만 건 이상의 의견을 접수했다는 수치는, 참여의 폭과 깊이를 상징적으로 보여준다.

 

핵심은 ‘정치적 권리’와 ‘경제·사회적 권리’를 결합하려는 시도다. 보고서는 “굶주리고, 목마르고, 집이 없는데 자유롭다고 할 수 있는가?”라는 물음으로, 자유를 물질적 조건과 분리하지 않는 민주주의의 정의를 제시한다. 중국식 거버넌스의 정당성은, 절차적 선거만이 아니라 생활의 개선과 사회 권리의 확장이라는 결과로 측정되어야 한다는 주장이다.

 

4. 서구 자유민주주의에 대한 이론적 비판: ‘형식의 한계’와 ‘계급의 그림자’

 

후반부는 서구 자유민주주의에 대한 비판적 검토다. 요지는 세 가지다.

 

ㅡ 형식적 절차의 자족성과 엘리트 포획

다당제와 선거가 존재해도 선거자금, 언론 소유구조, 로비의 영향력은 정책을 엘리트 선호에 맞게 왜곡한다. 2014년 케임브리지대 출판 논문이 ‘미국 정책은 종종 다수의 선호와 상충해도 엘리트/조직 로비의 선호를 따른다’고 지적한 바 있고, 앞서 소개한 민주주의 인식 조사에서 미국인의 자국 민주주의 신뢰도가 낮은 점이 이를 뒷받침한다.

 

ㅡ 정치의 축소와 경제의 비정치화

정치 참여가 주기적 선거로 환원되고, 생산과 투자 결정은 자본의 통제하에 놓여 대중의 생활 필요와는 분리된다. 그 결과, 높은 총생산에도 주거·영양·대중교통 같은 기본재가 만성적으로 부족해지는 ‘왜곡’이 발생한다. 보고서는 ‘정치적 권리’가 ‘경제·사회적 권리’로 확장되지 않으면 민주주의는 공허해진다고 주장한다.

 

ㅡ 제국주의·주변부 요인의 긴장

서구의 복지·사회민주주의는 역사적으로 혁명적 동원(러시아 혁명 등)과 경쟁(냉전)의 압박 속에서, 그리고 주변부의 잉여 착취 위에 유지된 측면이 있었다는 비판이 제시된다. 글로벌 축적 환경이 바뀌면서 서구 내부에서 사회민주주의적 합의가 후퇴하고, 대외적 압박이 강화된 현실은 ‘자본 축적과 민주주의의 긴장’을 보여주는 징후로 읽힌다.

 

이 비판의 목적은 서구를 깎아내리는 데 있지 않다. 보고서는 ‘민주주의의 심화’가 필요하다고 주장한다. 즉, 형식적 절차를 넘어, 생활의 물질적 조건과 대중 참여의 실재성을 강화해야 한다는 방향 제시다. 중국식 모델은 그 대조 사례로 자신을 제시하지만, 스스로의 한계와 시행착오를 인정하고 ‘피드백·책임’ 메커니즘의 강화 필요성도 병기한다.

 

5. ‘전과정 인민민주주의’의 운영 원리: ‘참여 경로’와 ‘책임의 닫힌 고리’

 

중국의 ‘전과정 인민민주주의(全過程人民民主)’ 모델은 서구의 ‘선거 민주주의’와 ‘숙의(토론) 민주주의’라는 두 가지 주요 민주주의 모델을 통합하여 자신을 설명한다. 이 모델은 투표장의 순간을 넘어서, 일상의 문제 해결과 정책 설계에 상시적인 참여가 보장될 때 민주주의가 시민의 삶에서 실재한다는 원리를 기반으로 한다. 이 개념을 이해하는 실용적 키워드는 참여 경로의 다층화와 책임의 닫힌 고리라는 두 가지 핵심 원리이다.

 

1) 참여 경로의 다층화: 풀뿌리부터 국가 최고 권력까지

전과정 인민민주주의는 단순히 중앙정부 차원의 제도가 아니라, 향진(鄕鎭, 읍면) 단위의 기층 자치부터 국가 최고 권력기관인 전국인민대표대회(전인대)에 이르기까지 상호 연결된 다단계의 참여 구조를 구축한다.

 

 

A. 기층 민주주의와 직접 선거
전과정 인민민주주의의 기반은 기층 선거에서 시작된다. 향 인민대표(鄕人代表)는 지역 주민들이 직접 선출하며, 촌위원회, 도시 주민위원회, 기업 및 공공기관 직장 대표대회 선거를 포함하는 기층 선거는 중국에서 가장 광범위하고 역동적인 민주주의 형태를 나타낸다.

 

이 기층 단위에서는 직접 선거와 함께 지역협의 회의 및 포럼을 통해 자치 촌위원회를 통한 참여가 보장된다. 이는 선거(촌·향·현) → 협의(회의·세미나·공청회·온라인 플랫폼) → 의사결정(주민·대표회의·전문위원회) → 관리(자치 규범·공공서비스 운영) → 감독(행정심사·소송·불만 제기)의 다섯 차원이 상호연결되어, ‘의견이 제도에 닿고 다시 현장으로 돌아오는’ 닫힌 회로를 만든다. 민주 촌 사례의 민회, 제안 박스, 공개 사무실, 서비스 핫라인 ‘12345’ 등은 이 회로의 풀뿌리 버전이다.

 

 

B. 다단계 간접 선거와 숙의 민주주의의 통합
기층 단위에서 선출된 대표들은 다시 상위 정부급의 대표를 선출하는 다단계 간접 선거 제도를 통해 중앙으로 연결된다.

 

●지방단위의 협의: 현(縣, 군)급에는 현 인민대표대회와 현 정협위원회, 그리고 농업, 공업, 교육 등 각 분야의 전문위원회가 있으며, 주요 현안에 대한 공청회가 열린다. 시(市)급과 성(省, 도)급에서도 인민대표대회와 정협위원회, 그리고 다양한 부문별 협의체와 정책 협의 과정이 운영된다.

●국가 최고 권력기관: 전국인민대표대회(NPC)는 중국의 최고 국가권력 기관으로, 다단계 간접 선거를 통해 대표가 선출된다. 2023년 전인대는 2,977명의 위원을 보유했으며, 특히 소수민족(14.85%)과 최전선 노동자 및 농민(16.69%)의 대표성이 높게 보장되어 있다.

●전국정치협상회의(CPPCC): 전인대와 병행하여 운영되는 정협은 중국 8개 민주당파, 소수민족, 종교 단체, 각계 저명인사 등이 참여하는 정치 대화와 합의 도출을 위한 협의체 역할을 한다.

 

이러한 다층적 구조는 '대중 노선' 프로세스(전개 과정)의 진화를 반영한다. 아이디어, 정책, 보고서가 지역사회에서 국가 수준으로 필터링(선별)되어 올라가고, 다시 정책 구현 프로세스에 아래로 적용되는 순환 과정을 통해 인민의 참여를 국가 통치에 통합한다.

 

2) 책임·투명성의 제도화: 분권화된 행정과 강력한 감독

전과정 인민민주주의 모델의 실효성은 책임과 투명성의 제도화에 달려 있다. 이는 정부의 효율성과 반응성을 극대화하여 제도적 신뢰를 구축하는 핵심 기제이다.

 

A. 지방 정부의 압도적 책임과 반응성
중국은 중앙정부가 전체 정부 지출의 15%만을 담당하는 반면 성(省), 주(州), 현(縣), 향(鄕), 촌(村) 단위를 포함한 지방 정부가 정부 수입의 50%와 지출의 약 85%를 차지하는 극도로 분권화된 국가이다. 이는 세계 평균(중앙정부 지출 66%)과 비교했을 때 매우 이례적이다.

 

이러한 구조는 생활과 가까운 문제를 지방단위에서 직접 다루도록 만들며, 참여와 책임의 거리를 촘촘하게 한다. 지방 정부의 성과는 곧 주민들의 일상적인 삶의 질과 직결되기 때문에, ‘인민의 우려를 즉시 해결하는’ 행정 반응성은 제도적 신뢰의 기초로 제시된다.

 

B. 강력한 감독과 징계 메커니즘
책임의 닫힌 고리는 공무원에 대한 강력한 감독과 징계 메커니즘을 통해 완성된다. 시민, 법인, 단체는 행정심사 요청, 소송, 그리고 감독 기관에 대한 위법 행위, 직무 유기, 권력 남용 또는 직업윤리 위반에 대한 불만 제기를 통해 국가 기관과 직원의 성과를 감독할 수 있다.

 

특히, 공무원에 대한 해임, 징계, 부패 신고의 실효성이 강조되며, 2012년부터 2022년까지 470만 명이 처벌받았다는 통계는 이 책임 메커니즘의 엄격함을 보여준다.

 

3) 결론: 숙의와 실질적 개선을 통한 정당성 확보

전과정 인민민주주의는 단순히 서구식 선거 민주주의의 부재를 변명하는 것이 아니라, 숙의 민주주의와 실질적 성과를 통해 정당성을 확보하려는 중국 특유의 통치 모델이다. 이 모델은 인민의 참여를 확대하고, 정부의 책임과 투명성을 제도화함으로써, 대중의 물질적 조건에 대한 정부의 실질적인 반응을 통해 국가 통치에 대한 인민의 참여를 더욱 확대하고 있다. 이는 중국의 정치 체제를 권위주의적 불법성의 틀로만 해석하는 서구 학계 내부의 지배적인 담론에 근본적인 도전을 제기한다.

 

 

6.  의의: 민주주의의 기준을 다시 묻다

 

보고서가 던지는 질문은 단순하다. 민주주의를 무엇으로 평가할 것인가. 형식적 자유와 선거 절차만으로 충분한가, 아니면 물질적 권리·생활 개선·참여의 실재성까지 포함해야 하는가? 민주 촌의 재개발은 ‘주민이 삶의 주인이 되는’ 과정을 제도적으로 돕는 실험이며, 높은 정부 신뢰는 ‘생활이 바뀐’ 경험과 연결된다. 서구 자유민주주의에 대한 비판은 ‘절차의 빛’과 ‘생활의 그늘’ 사이의 간극을 지적한다.

 

물론 모든 모델은 맹점을 가진다. 중국의 전과정 인민민주주의 역시 참여의 질·지역간 격차·피드백 메커니즘의 지속가능성 같은 과제를 안고 있다. 보고서는 그럼에도 불구하고, ‘민주주의의 심화’를 목표로 한 역사적·제도적 실험의 궤적을 긍정적으로 그려낸다. 민주주의가 ‘주기적 의식’이 아니라 ‘일상의 실천’이라면, 참여의 폭과 물질적 개선의 깊이는 민주주의의 본질적 척도일 수 있다.

 

■ 편집자 ㅡ 민주 촌에서 시작해 국가로 이어지는 ‘참여의 사다리’

 

현장을 보면 국가가 보인다. 민주 촌의 광장 민회와 제안박스는, 전인대·정협의 협의·입법 과정에 상향 연계되는 ‘참여의 사다리’의 첫 단에 놓여 있다. 하천 정화, 공동식당, 직거래 장터의 재설계 같은 생활 개선은, 주민 수요가 제도에 반영되고 다시 일상으로 돌아오는 순환의 증거이다. 그리고 이 순환이 축적될 때, 민중은 국가를 신뢰한다. 통계 수치가 이를 말한다.

 

지금은 민주주의의 의미를 다시 묻는 시대다. 절차를 넘어 결과로, 형식을 넘어 생활로, 순간을 넘어 전과정으로. 이처럼 이 보고서의 메시지는 선명하다. 민주주의는 투표장에서만 살아 있지 않다. 사람들의 삶에서, 매일의 문제 해결에서, 그리고 그 과정에 참여할 권리와 능력을 키워주는 제도에 살아 있어야 한다. 중국의 전과정 인민민주주의는 그 실험의 한 버전이고, 민주 촌은 그 실험의 생생한 장면이다. 어느 모델을 선택하든, 민주주의가 삶의 품질을 끌어올리는 힘으로 작동하도록 만드는 것—그것이 우리가 공유해야 할 공통의 목표다.

 

[울산함성 무료구독 신청]  https://t.me/+ji13hLs-vL83ZTBl

 

 

Chinese Whole Procee People Democracy.

 

BY Paweł Wargan and Jason Hickel
From The China Report.

 

For Building the Future, a research collection on contemporary socialist construction, Paweł Wargan and Jason Hickel look at the concept of “whole-process people’s democracy” in China, a complex system of political participation and grassroots governance that is a mainstay of the process of Chinese modernisation.

 

In Minzhu Village, a small community in the Jiulongpo District of the sprawling metropolis of Chongqing, a remarkable transformation has taken place. Once a maze of crumbling buildings and narrow, muddy roads, Minzhu Village is now a modern community with radiant red-brick walls, landscaped paths, and thriving public services. It has a sustainable farmers’ market built with recycled materials, a public canteen that provides free meals for the elderly, fitness parks, stages for public performances, modern and affordable cafes, and a craft-beer bar housed in stacked shipping containers. On the main square, across from the three-story canteen, the Communist Party of China (CPC) operates a sleek public office, where residents can seek the support of Party cadres on anything from repainting their homes to resolving neighbourly disputes. Just a few years ago, sewage ran through a canal down the length of the main thoroughfare. Children and the elderly now dip their feet in the stream that has taken its place. 

Minzhu Village once housed one of China’s most important enterprises: the State-Owned Chongqing Construction Machine Tool Factory (国营建设机床厂). The factory traces its roots back to the Hanyang Arsenal (汉阳兵工厂), a major producer of arms during the Qing Dynasty. During the Second Sino-Japanese war, the Hanyang Arsenal was moved to Jiulongpo District and, in 1957, officially renamed the Machine Tool Factory. This factory became one of China's largest military enterprises, producing semi-automatic rifles and submachine guns. At its peak, the factory employed over 20,000 workers, and Minzhu Village was constructed to house them. Built in the style of Soviet apartment blocks and in red-orange brick, the Village came to embody the period of rapid industrialization and change that swept the country.

In 2009, the Machine Tool Factory was relocated to the Huaxi Industrial Park in Banan District as part of a new policy on urban redevelopment. Already weathered and worn, Minzhu Village began to decline. Its infrastructure decayed and its population aged and dwindled. Officials considered demolishing the village and relocating its residents. But the community had generational bonds to the area, which itself held historic significance for the country. Instead of demolition, the village underwent a comprehensive program of regeneration. It became a model for the rest of the country — and provided a striking example of participatory processes in China’s development. Following the launch of an urban-renewal pilot program in 2021, the CPC organized hundreds of “courtyard meetings” in Minzhu Village — community gatherings held in the public square, where residents aired grievances, voiced opinions, and shared ideas for the neighbourhood’s redevelopment. Mailbox No. 1, a mailbox originally set up in 1953 as a communication channel for workers of the Machine Tool Factory, was digitized and expanded into a formal program collecting thousands of suggestions from residents. And a station was set up to facilitate public surveys at all levels of the community — further extending the role of the mailbox. 

Today, parts of Minzhu Village recall hip corners of London or Berlin. But the neighborhood’s transformation followed a different path to what often occurs in the metropoles of the West. Although the process implied the same kind of qualitative changes associated with gentrification in many major cities, it did not displace the local working population in Minzhu Village. Instead, it improved their lives, drawing them increasingly into the living standards of the urban middle class — out of poverty, and into what the CPC calls “moderate prosperity”, a stage of development where basic needs are met and a comfortable standard of living becomes available to all. This was grounded in needs articulated before, during, and after the redevelopment process by members of the community. The farmers’ market was modernized, the stream was cleaned up, the canteen was built, and new institutions and infrastructures for leisure, recreation, and community development were constructed around the Village.1 

 

This process — of broad, popular consultation that transforms the lives of working people — is the cornerstone of the Chinese notion of “whole-process people’s democracy”. It reflects a revolutionary methodology that seeks to develop a “mass line” by continuously interpreting, systematizing, and realizing the ideas of the people. This can be a difficult process. Xiong Jie and Tings Chak have described in detail how it worked during the restoration of Erhai Lake, which involved a prolonged back-and-forth between party officials and local residents to overcome conflicts, reach compromises, and gain popular support for practical solutions.2

The approach fundamentally challenges the prevailing narratives in the West about the Chinese government’s lack of democracy and popular legitimacy — suggesting, instead, that the Chinese democratic process is in many ways  responsive and  participatory than Western models of liberal democracy. Indeed, data collected in several studies on this question — many of them conducted by established Western liberal institutions — show not only that the government in China enjoys substantial popular support at all levels, but also that more people in China believe their political system is democratic, fair, and serves the interests of the people than almost anywhere else in the world.

This paper provides an overview of the Chinese democratic model. First, it considers the nature of socialist democracy as opposed to liberal democracy. Second, it looks at the characteristics of “whole-process people’s democracy” in China and contrasts it with the democratic models that prevail in the West. Third, it looks at data on system support and public perceptions of democracy in China. 
To many in the West, democracy requires the existence of multiple parties capable of containing within them different visions for the future of society and giving expression to different opinions. In this view, the state is a neutral arbiter and the principle of “one person, one vote” guarantees equality of democratic participation. 

This is a nice ideal, but it obfuscates the role of class power. In such a system, it is very easy for the dominant class — the class with the most financial and organizational power — to determine political outcomes in its own interests, capture the state, and prevent any democratic challenges to its rule. Indeed this is precisely what occurs under capitalism. The result is that the state serves as an instrument of capitalist class rule. Its institutional arrangements and political customs serve to advance and secure the domination by one class over another. “Order” and “stability” moderate class conflict in the interests of preserving the power of capital and preventing the emergence of a political system that serves working people.3 In effect, liberal democracy  the consolidation and operation of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. 

"Socialist democracy must... be seen as a historic, multi-generational and dialectical process by which conditions that enable increasing parts of society to play an active role in governance are created, nurtured, and defended."

Western states are routinely described as democracies. But in reality the exercise of democracy is severely curtailed. In the US, for instance, power is passed back and forth between two establishment parties, both of which are explicitly pro-capitalist and committed to the interests of the capitalist class. Third parties — including socialist parties — are effectively frozen out of the national political process; they face serious obstacles when it comes to getting on ballots and securing airtime in official political debates. What is more, elites and corporations can spend unlimited money on campaign finance, to promote and install politicians who will shape policy to their benefit, in what can only be described as institutionalized political corruption. Democracy is meaningless under these conditions. 

A 2014 study published by Cambridge University Press found that US policy implementation generally follows the preferences of elites and organized business lobbies, even when it runs against the preferences of the majority.4 In other words, the US more closely resembles an oligarchy than a democracy. This reality is reflected in opinion surveys. Data from the Democracy Perception Index shows that only 54% of US Americans believe their country is actually democratic, and only 42% say the government serves the majority of people.5 These are striking figures in the country that promotes itself as a bastion of “democracy”.

Even in countries with more robust multi-party systems and limits on campaign finance, there are severe constraints placed on democratic processes. For instance, under conditions where the dominant media outlets are owned by capitalist firms, or indeed directly controlled by billionaires and oligarchs, it is virtually impossible for working-class political movements to get a fair hearing. As we saw in Britain during the 2017 election, the major media companies closed ranks and ran a coordinated disinformation campaign that demonized the socialist left and succeeded in locking them out of power.

More importantly, under capitalism democracy is relegated to periodic and highly ritualized participation in the  realm, but is entirely precluded in the  realm, even though the latter affects our everyday lives and determines the shape and direction of our civilization. When capital controls production, the purpose of production and reinvestment is not to meet human needs, achieve social progress, or realise democratically ratified objectives; the purpose is to maximize and accumulate profits. Decisions about how to use our labour and the productive capacities of our society are made in the narrow interests of the capitalist class.  The workers — the people actually doing the production — rarely get any voice at all. This arrangement is profoundly undemocratic. Indeed, it is reasonable to say that, regardless of whatever political arrangements a given society might have, if people do not have control over their own production and over investment of the surplus they generate, it cannot be described as a democracy. This arrangement explains the perverse outcomes we see in capitalist economies, where even in cases of high aggregate production, there are chronic shortages of basic things like affordable housing, nutritious food and public transit.

As far as capital is concerned, democracy is dangerous and must be prevented as much as possible. Indeed, the only concessions capitalism has historically made to the working classes have occurred in conditions of militant social struggle and tectonic global transformation. The expansion of democratic political parties in early 20th century Europe followed a period of prolonged labor militancy, which won concessions from the capitalist classes who were eager to stave off revolutionary momentum. Early socially-oriented policies in the West can also be traced to the perceived risk of communist revolution inspired by October 1917, and by the integration of Western European communist parties into the Communist International.6 

In the second half of the 20th century, a robust social democratic consensus emerged from the ashes of world war and reflected the systemic confrontation with the Soviet Union, which had secured tremendous prestige globally in defeating European fascism while making historic strides in industrialization and social development. This was a real victory for the Western working classes, although it is crucial to recall that capitalists were only willing to make these concessions because they knew they could maintain conditions for accumulation by relying on surplus appropriated from the periphery. Social democracy in the core has always relied on an imperial arrangement.

Today, the core economies struggle to achieve the rates of growth and accumulation that characterized previous decades, largely because of increasing movements for economic sovereignty in the periphery. As a result, Western governments are responding by dismantling the social democratic compact at home and escalating imperial violence abroad, revealing that capitalism’s accommodations to working people were only ever granted insofar as they remained structurally compatible with continued capital accumulation.

Socialists have long understood these tendencies. They have understood that an open political system with privately owned media cannot, in the context of severe imbalances in class power, deliver real democracy. This is particularly true in the periphery, where imperialist powers are adept at intervening in elections and other political processes to crush liberation movements and prop up comprador elites. 

Political parties — like the state — cannot be understood outside questions of class. Parties emerge, attract support, and function as representatives of a given class interest and reflect the dynamic balance of power among the classes. Absent a party created in their image, the working class is forced to align politically with an alien subjectivity: the subjectivity of the oppressing class. The existence of multiple, competing capitalist parties truncates the political horizon of working people by dividing them along secondary issues that conceal the fundamental class contradictions that structure their societies and their lives. This transforms non-antagonistic contradictions within the working class into antagonistic ones,7 forexamplebydividingworkingpeopleonquestionsofimmigration,ratherthanunitingthemintheserviceofliberation. 

Various possible socialist alternatives have been advanced. For instance, after the removal of the capitalist class from control over production and the state, a multi-party system could be established where all parties must subscribe to basic socialist principles. This is multi-party democratic socialism.  However, this approach may still be vulnerable to imperialist intervention, which could leverage party conflict to destabilize a country or bring down a government. An alternative path, chosen by China, is government by a single Communist Party with a mass membership broadly representative of the people, which is constitutionally committed to advancing the interests of the working class, which has an organic grassroots presence in communities with strong practices of engagement and consultation, and which is organized according to internal democratic practices (democratic centralism).

 
Beyond political-procedural measures, the objective of socialist democracy is also to extend the principle of democracy into the realm of production. Decisions about what to invest in, what to produce, and who should benefit from the yields of production — all of these should be subject to the will of the people and aligned with the interests of the working classes.

 
The representation of the masses of people in the political and economic process opens the door to a much more expansive set of claims that can be made against the state. If Western democracy confines itself to formal political rights and freedoms — which in themselves are heavily constrained when they come to threaten the class domination of capitalists within the state — socialist democracy seeks also to realize those  the masses’  and  rights. This is because substantive liberation cannot be attained in conditions of economic deprivation. Can someone be said to be free if they are hungry, thirsty or homeless? Freedom is not simply a rhetorical commitment. It has to emerge alongside the realization of certain material and historical conditions. It requires stable development and a state capable of channeling that development to serve social needs. As Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote in : 8

 
People experience oppression and deprivation in different ways that reflect the specifics of their local geographies, economies, histories, and cultures. There can be no one-size-fits all approach to advancing their political, economic and social rights. That is why socialism  the deep participation of the masses of people in the process of development. Without active discussion, democracy can produce little more than silent acquiescence to policies and solutions of a highly  nature. This is a necessary objective of socialism, even though not all actually-existing socialisms have achieved it in equal measure.  

Reflecting on the organization of Party cadres, Mao Zedong emphasized, “No one in a leading position is competent to give general guidance to all the units unless he derives concrete experience from particular individuals and events...”9 In other words, there needs to exist an organic bond between the mechanisms of the Party and the concrete experiences of the people. In representing the interests of the vast majority, the Communist Party must create the conditions for mass participation in the governance of the state. Without this, the thread binding the people to the process of socialist construction is lost and the state’s direction of movement is distorted by bureaucratic inertia or other narrow interests. 

But it would be idealistic to demand that a revolutionary process conjure a system of universal participation immediately, as many Western Marxists insist. Social transformation can be a long and difficult road, and the weight of historical inheritance, expressed in disparities in education, resources, productive capacities, and institutional stability, requires a systematic approach. Attitudes and cultural norms that linger from the old world — patterns of exploitation and submission — cannot be overcome with a snap of the fingers. Some of the earliest elections in China had peasants vote by putting a stone in the bowl of their preferred candidate; the peasants were illiterate. 

Every socialist country has faced an extreme state of exception, with constant military encirclement, economic warfare through sanctions and blockade, and cultural-informational assaults waged by imperialism. In this context, revolutionary states may choose to prioritize national defence and industrial development as a safeguard against the subordination of its structures of social reproduction to the anarchic and destructive mode of imperialist accumulation. As an expression of popular sovereignty within the state, democracy cannot be construed without consideration for its material safeguards, or abstracted from the schemes by which imperialism seeks to thwart it. 

Socialist democracy must, therefore, be seen as a historic, multi-generational and dialectical process by which conditions that enable increasing parts of society to play an active role in governance are created, nurtured, and defended. China has advanced on this path further than most societies in modern history. From early experiments in village-level organization to building a nationwide process for 1.4 billion people from 56 ethnic groups across a country spanning over nine million square kilometers, this process has come to be contained in a concept called “whole-process people’s democracy” — a practice of democratic governance built on over a century of organizational experience.  

The concept of “whole-process people’s democracy” was first articulated by President Xi Jinping in a September 2014 speech at a conference marking the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).10 Xi emphasized the “consultative” element that had long been embedded in China’s socialist democracy. “Putting people's democracy into practice and ensuring the people's position as masters of the country,” he said, “demands that we initiate extensive discussions throughout the whole of society while governing the country.”11 

To understand the role of consultation in the Chinese revolutionary process, it is necessary to briefly revisit the history of the development of the CPC. From as early as the 1930s, the times of the Jiangxi Soviet Republic, the Party experimented with strategies to incorporate the masses — who for centuries had been downtrodden and never sufficiently organized to dislodge the structures of oppression that held them down — into active political life. This, it was widely understood, was the only way to build the revolution. It would have been impossible to overcome the “three mountains” of imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism without organizing the majority of society against their oppressors. From this premise emerged the concept of the “mass line” and a process of studying the views of the masses, coordinating and systematizing them, and then taking them back to the masses where they could be adopted as popular analysis and their correctness could be tested through collective action. The exercise repeats, again and again, in a continuous process of identifying and resolving the contradictions facing society. "In all the practical work of our Party,” Mao Zedong said, “all correct leadership is necessarily ‘from the masses, to the masses’.”12

"The Chinese model demonstrates that democracy need not be confined to periodic electoral exercises or formal procedural rights divorced from material conditions."

In his ethnographic study of the revolutionary transformation of China’s Long Bow Village between 1945 and 1948, William Hinton observed how this process was applied to radically upend the centuries-old structures and traditions of feudalism. It was through consultation that land was redistributed and women gained their rights. It was through consultation that property expropriated from feudal landlords was redistributed to families that often had just one pot and a single change of clothes. It was through consultation that the management of newly collectivised plots of land was organized. At each stage, the  process of collectively formulating challenges, developing solutions, and testing these solutions against material realities helped develop the masses’ capacities for governance. “Thus the peasants, under the guidance of the Communist Party, had moved step by step from partial knowledge to general knowledge, from spontaneous action to directed action, from limited success to over-all success,” Hinton wrote. “And through this process they had transformed themselves from passive victims of natural and social forces into active builders of a new world.”13

The CPC’s rise to power through mass revolutionary mobilization, explicitly oriented toward improving conditions for peasants and workers, established the foundational relationships between the masses and the state that continue to underpin the Chinese social contract. That process developed — with advances, setbacks, successes, and failures — in the decades that followed the revolution. Today, the CPC has grown to include more than 100 million members and over 75 million youth league members. In effect, every family has at least one person in the Party, ensuring not only that a wide diversity of social positions and political views are represented  the party, but also that the CPC has direct channels to understanding what every segment of Chinese society wants or needs. Internally, the CPC operates under the model of democratic centralism, which constitutes the fundamental organizational principle and leadership system of the Party. Under this model, vigorous debate is encouraged internally at all levels to pool the collective wisdom of Party members. Then, CPC members commit to upholding agreed-upon decisions, ensuring that the efforts of the Party converge behind common goals.  

It is worth emphasizing here that the CPC cannot be seen in the same light as political parties in liberal democracies. It is not an instrument of political competition. It is, instead, both a vehicle for mass participation in governance and a guarantor of the political system as a whole. In fact, China is not a one-party state. It has nine official parties: the CPC and eight democratic parties. This system is a historical inheritance. At the start of the 20th century, China experimented with multi-party liberal democracy. The effects were all but democratic. Over 300 parties formed around the country and, between 1912 and 1928, that system produced 10 different heads of state, 45 cabinets, and 59 prime ministers — sixteen years of political chaos. The period of one-party dictatorship under Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang also failed, producing economic crisis and military defeat. All along, new parties emerged to contest power. A new political system was needed and the mandate to build it fell on the CPC. The system that emerged focused on developing a cooperative rather than competitive relationship among the existing political parties, which would serve as channels for different segments of society to participate in governance — for example by conducting research or consulting on legislation.14  

This historical trajectory reflects a source of democratic legitimacy derived not from abstract institutional arrangements but from demonstrable improvements in material conditions for the majority of China’s population. Lin Shangli argues for advancing policies that have “wholehearted support from the people” and deliver “sustained, stable, and sound national development” — achievements that would be impossible without robust consultative processes capable of identifying and resolving the concrete problems faced by the population.15 Xi Jinping — who has sought to increase grassroots democratic mechanisms — has emphasised this in his speeches and writings: 16

Three principal contrasts can be drawn with liberal democratic models in the West. First, in the West, the concept of democracy remains trapped in the straightjacket of idealism. It is treated as complete, a political system that has reached its final destination, an assertion that enables the weaponisation of liberal democracy against those that seek to advance rights that it does not accommodate. There is little talk in the West of deepening, expanding, or improving liberal democracy. For its lack of a clear scientific basis, Chinese scholars have referred to the Western system as “superstitious” or “cult”-like.17 “Whole-process people’s democracy”, by contrast, is understood within the framework of historical and dialectical materialism. It is an ever-expanding process, which necessarily deepens, broadens and improves as greater parts of the population are drawn into the system of governance, and whose impacts are measured by the material and immaterial improvements it makes to people's lives. “There is no end to the human exploration and practice of democracy,” write Cheng Enfu and Chen Jian.18  

As part of this process, China learns from its own mistakes and shortcomings. As in any country, there have been moments where insufficient feedback and accountability mechanisms in the policy-making process have had adverse consequences, sometimes serious, on the country and its people. But China’s current system reflects a determination to absorb the lessons from history and — through continuous reflection and feedback — re-calibrate policy to overcome past limitations.  

Second, Western liberal democracies ensure that few people are active in the political process outside the voting booth — a limited and periodic exercise whose outcomes are warped and corrupted by disparities in economic power. By contrast, China’s democratic model aims to sustain the masses’ broad participation in the political process at all times and at all levels — this is what is meant by “whole process”. This is true at the voting booth. In 2016 and 2017, over 900 million voters took part in elections to people’s congresses at the township and county levels — the first two levels of China’s five-level system of elections representing 90% community participation. In more recent years, the number of voters has reached over one billion, exceeding the number of voters in India and making China’s elections the largest democratic elections conducted anywhere in the world. But mass participation must also be true beyond the voting booth, a point that Xi Jinping highlighted in a speech in October 2021: 
 
The promise of political equality contained in the concept of “one person, one vote” does not, on its own, extend to the more expansive social and economic rights contained within socialist conceptions of development and democracy. Apart from elections, then, “whole-process people’s democracy” ensures mass participation through consultations, seminars, meetings, debates, symposia, hearings, councils, criticisms, and other forms of popular feedback that help shape legislative and policy outcomes. In this way, when China was developing its Civil Code, it held 10 rounds of public consultations, receiving over one million comments from 425,000 people.19 In the ongoing consultations for China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, set to be implemented from 2026 to 2030, the Chinese government received over three million suggestions from the public — or three times more than it did over a similar period for the 14th Five-Year Plan in 2020.20

These figures alone do not capture the breadth and depth of the process, which involves a complex tapestry of channels for popular consultation and feedback. Like the mailbox in Minzhu Village, the state operates so-called “12345 service hotlines” across the country. These hotlines, which guarantee an “immediate response upon receipt of complaint”, aim at addressing public concerns and form part of a broader toolkit of communications channels that include call centers, mayoral mailboxes, mobile apps, and groups on WeChat, China’s “everything app”. In this way, governments at all levels respond to public demands and address the issues and problems that directly concern the public. At the legislative level, the development of policies tends to follow extensive, multi-year processes where political parties, research institutions, mass movements and other organizations across the country are enlisted to carry out research and host debates and conferences on concrete policy questions, which then feed back into the process of policy formation. Ahead of the 20th National Congress of the CPC, for example, 54 research institutions took part in carrying out studies that fed into the official report, producing 80 papers. In that process, 64 research teams carried out 179 field visits to provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities; 25 research teams conducted written surveys of 465 organizations; and 10 research teams commissioned 252 organizations to conduct specialized studies. The research teams engaged 19,022 participants, and conducted consultations and interviews with 1,847 individuals. Online public opinion consultations for the 20th Congress Report received over eight million responses.21 

Third, liberal democracy is exercised primarily by and in the interests of the capitalist ruling class. As a result, great pains are taken to constrain societies’ politicization outside the narrow parameters that preserve the dominion of capital over labour — and there are few mechanisms to hold power to account beyond elections. Where political activation occurs outside of electoral periods, it necessarily emerges in opposition to government and state policies, and is often expressed as a reaction to broken electoral promises. This is because the control of the state by capitalists necessarily produces antagonistic class relations, with the capitalist class seeking to maximise its benefit through oppression, while the working class seeks to abolish that oppression. By contrast, in a revolutionary society, the masses have seized state power and therefore  the state and represent the primary source of its legitimacy and power. As Mao Zedong observed, this produces contradictions of a fundamentally different nature than those that exist within capitalism:  22

The imperative is therefore to generate structures of governance and cultures of political accountability that work alongside the state system to advance common goals. This is what is meant by “people’s democracy”, a concept that emerged in contrast to “bourgeois democracy”. It is a system in which policies strive to “truly reflect the people’s concerns, embody their aspirations, promote their wellbeing, and meet their desire for a better life.”23 Victor Gao — a Chinese lawyer and academic who is a member of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, one of the eight democratic parties in China — compared the Chinese and Western democratic models to a car. In the Chinese system, he said, the car’s wheels all move in one direction. In other systems, the wheels of the same car move in conflicting directions, “resulting not in synergy or coordination and greater results, but inefficiency, incompetence, a lack of achievements, and no fundamental benefits for the people.”24 The need to move in a shared direction has consequences for the accountability of officials: voters can not only elect officials into office, but also remove them from power if they do not adequately reflect the interests of the people.25 The public is also encouraged to report officials for corruption or misconduct and such reports have real consequences. Between 2012 and 2022, 4.7 million people faced various forms of punishment for corruption alone.26 

The Chinese model of “whole-process people’s democracy” thus integrates two major democratic models: electoral democracy and consultative democracy. It begins at the township level (乡镇级), where Township People’s Congresses are directly elected by communities. At this level, participation is also guaranteed by self-governing village committees with direct elections and local consultation meetings and forums. Elections at the grassroots level represent the most extensive and dynamic form of democracy in China, which includes the election of village committees, urban residents committees, and employee congresses in enterprises and public institutions. This is significant because China remains heavily decentralized. Local governments — including the provincial, prefectural, county, township, and village levels — make up 50 percent of government revenue and account for nearly 85 percent of expenditures. China’s central government is responsible for only 15 percent of total government expenditure — the global average is 66 percent.27

At the county level (县级), there are County People’s Congresses supported by county CPPCC committees; specialized committees on agriculture, industry, education, and other areas; and public hearings on major issues. At the prefecture/city level (地市级), there are Municipal People’s Congresses and their standing committees, municipal CPPCC committees, sector-specific consultation mechanisms, and broad public participation in urban planning and development. At the provincial level (省级), there are Provincial People's Congresses and their standing committees, provincial CPPCC committees, inter-regional coordination mechanisms, and policy consultation processes with academic institutions and think tanks. Once the people elect deputies at the township and county levels, those deputies in turn elect deputies at higher levels of government (see Figure 1).

China's community-level self-governance operates through five interconnected dimensions of democracy that create a comprehensive system of local participation and control.  forms the foundation through grassroots elections for villagers' committees, urban residents' committees, and employee congresses in enterprises and public institutions, with committee leaders and members elected simultaneously with township and county-level positions.  encompasses diverse channels including proposals, conferences, discussions, seminars, hearings, assessments, internet platforms, and opinion polls, allowing communities to address matters affecting people's vital interests, particularly those concerning specific groups' rights.  occurs through various meeting formats among villagers, urban residents, and their representatives, covering economic and social issues, infrastructure, social management, cultural services, environmental conservation, self-governance regulations, and other key local matters, with residents participating in both decision-making and implementation.  empowers urban and rural communities to establish their own rules and conventions governing residents' rights and obligations, organizational procedures, collective economy principles, neighborhood security, public safety, sanitation, marriage customs, family planning, and cultural activities, with communities managing their own public affairs and services under constitutional and legal frameworks. Finally,  enables citizens, legal entities, and organizations to supervise state organs and staff performance through administrative review requests, litigation, and complaints to supervisory bodies regarding misconduct, dereliction of duty, abuse of power, or professional ethics violations, creating accountability mechanisms that complete the cycle of grassroots democratic governance.28 Each of these levels was reflected in the comprehensive process of consultation that transformed Minzhu Village in Chongqing. 

At the national level, these processes converge in the National People's Congress (NPC) and the National Committee of the CPPCC, alongside State Council consultation mechanisms and central government policy consultation processes. The NPC serves as China's highest organ of state power, with delegates elected through a multi-tiered indirect election system beginning with the direct election of officials at the township level. In 2023, the NPC had 2,977 members, including representatives of all 56 ethnic groups, with minorities accounting for 14.85% of the total (in this sense, minorities — which comprise about 10% of China’s population — have higher-than-average representation in government). 16.69% of NPC members represented frontline workers and peasants, including 56 representatives of migrant workers. Party and government cadres represented 32.55% of the total, a figure that has slowly declined as more workers, peasants, and experts join the Congress.29 The NPC meets annually and has a Standing Committee that exercises power between sessions. The CPPCC operates parallel to the NPC system from national to local levels. It includes representatives from China’s eight democratic parties, ethnic minorities, religious groups, representatives from Hong Kong, Macau, the Taiwan region and Chinese people living abroad, and prominent individuals from various sectors. It serves as a consultative body for political dialogue and consensus-building.

Each of these levels of institutional decision-making reflects the evolution of the “mass line” process, where ideas, policies and reports are filtered upwards from communities to the national level and then applied downwards in the process of policy implementation — in the process refining and sharpening the tools that have made unprecedented improvements in peoples’ lives.  

The overview of the Chinese system of “whole-process people’s democracy” challenges the prevailing discourse within the Western academy, which construes China's political system through frameworks of authoritarian illegitimacy and positions the Chinese state as fundamentally dependent upon coercive mechanisms for its existence. Instead, the Chinese democratic process contains within it a rich tapestry of institutions and practices that, taken together, enable increasingly broad popular participation in the governance of the country. 

Equally important is the question of how the Chinese people themselves view their democratic model. Here, comprehensive survey data on Chinese perceptions of democracy, including from established Western liberal institutions, reveal not only that the Chinese people are overwhelmingly satisfied with the work of their central and provincial governments, but also that the vast majority of Chinese people view their government as democratic and working in the service of the people.

Here we report data from several major studies. First, the Harvard University Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation has maintained what constitutes the most extensive independent assessment of Chinese citizen satisfaction with governmental performance, tracking popular attitudes since 2003. Their 2020 report, "Understanding CCP [sic] Resilience: Surveying Chinese Public Opinion Through Time," revealed broad popular support for the Chinese government at all levels. The study's authors, operating within an analytical framework that initially presumed China's authoritarian character would generate legitimacy crises, instead documented consistent increases in citizen satisfaction. Central government approval reached 93% by 2016, with provincial governments maintaining 82% support rates — with consistent increases over time (see Figure 2). Significantly, the research identified that marginalized populations in economically disadvantaged inland regions demonstrated comparatively higher increases in satisfaction, suggesting, in line with Chinese thinking on the function of “whole-process people’s democracy”, that state responsiveness to material conditions constitutes a key mechanism of its legitimacy. 

 

The authors summarize their results as follows. “We find that, since the start of the survey in 2003, Chinese citizen satisfaction with government has increased virtually across the board. From the impact of broad national policies to the conduct of local town officials, Chinese citizens rate the government as more capable and effective than ever before. Interestingly, more marginalized groups in poorer, inland regions are actually comparatively more likely to report increases in satisfaction. Second, the attitudes of Chinese citizens appear to respond (both positively and negatively) to real changes in their material well-being.”31

These results are consistent with data from the Asian Barometer Survey, which in 2015 found that 87% of respondents in China had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in the national government.  So too with the World Values Survey, which consistently shows that over 90% of people in China report “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in the national government. In 2018, the most recent wave, trust was at 95%, one of the highest levels in the world.  

Complementing these findings, the Alliance of Democracies (AoD), established by former NATO leadership and Danish governmental officials, has produced annual reports of the Democracy Perception Index since 2019. Through partnership with German market research firm Latana, the AoD employs methodological approaches specifically designed to mitigate response bias and self-censorship concerns. The 2024 findings reveal that 92% of Chinese respondents consider democracy important, 79% characterize their country as democratic, and 91% perceive their government as serving broad popular interests rather than elite constituencies — each of these figures was higher than in almost any other country in the world, and far ahead on each of these metrics than respondents in the US, France and Britain, the classic liberal democracies (see Figure 3). 

 
The AoD study also assesses people’s perceptions of freedom of expression, and free and fair elections. Here too, China outperforms the US and most of Europe. When given the statement “Everyone in my country can freely express their opinion on political and social topics”, only 18% of people in China disagreed (compared to 27% in the US). And when given the statement “Political leaders in my country are elected in free and fair elections”, only 5% in China disagreed (compared to 27% in the US). 

Finally, a recent study published in the journal  asked people in 42 countries whether they think their system is fair and just.33 They used the following questions: “In general, I find society to be fair”, “In general my country’s political system operates as it should”, “Everyone in my country has a fair shot at wealth and happiness”, and “My country’s society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve”.  The results show that in most countries the average response is either “somewhat disagree” or “neutral”.  There is only one country where the average response is in the range of “somewhat agree”, and that is China.  In other words, people in China are more likely to agree their system is fair and just than any other country in the set. 

These are all remarkable results.  Some skeptics have questioned the data, saying that respondents may overstate support for their government if they live in a system where they are likely to fear repression for expressing political dissent. This is known as “strategic misreporting”.  But the fact that all of these studies find low scores in countries known for political repression suggests this is not a real problem. In any case, this question has been explored at length in the scholarly literature on China.  Researchers have carried out several studies using methods specifically designed to exclude strategic misreporting — such as list experiments and implicit association tests. Over and over again, these studies confirm that people in China do indeed have high levels of support for their government and their political-economic system.34 

These empirical findings mount a fundamental challenge to liberal analytical frameworks deployed to assess political legitimacy. The consistently high approval ratings documented across multiple independent studies suggest that legitimacy may derive less from procedural democratic forms than from substantive governmental responsiveness to popular material conditions. This observation aligns with historical materialist analyses that prioritize the relationship between state power, the popular masses, and economic development over purely procedural democratic mechanisms. 

Consider the fact that, over the past two decades, wages in the manufacturing sector in China have increased eight-fold. Wages in China have gone from being one of the lowest in Asia to now higher than in every other developing country in the region. China now has one of the highest life expectancies in the developing world. In fact, healthy life expectancy in China is now more than four years longer than in the US, according to GBDS data.35 These are major historical developments and their significance is not lost on the Chinese people.

We noted above that the objective of socialist democracy includes extending the principle of democracy into the realm of production. Our focus in this piece is on political processes and it is beyond our scope to explore whether and to what extent economic democracy has been achieved in China. This is a subject of considerable debate among socialists, including within China itself. On the one hand, public control over the financial sector and the commanding heights (state-owned firms account for nearly one-third of China’s GDP) allows China to direct investment and production in line with democratically-ratified national development plans. On the other hand, left critics point out that many Chinese workers' direct experience of the labour process remains one of exploitation within capitalist firms.  

In recent years, it appears that the CPC is pushing for more worker democracy within firms. For instance, recent directives require that firms with more than three employees who are CPC members must grant these workers representation in company governance. The coming decades will reveal more about the direction that the CPC takes on the issue of economic democracy, but from our conversations with people in China it seems clear that since 2012, and particularly since the 19th National Congress in 2017, the government has accelerated the push towards socialism; it is now China's official goal to build a “modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized, and harmonious" by 2049. These are not mere slogans, but reflections of a broad range of concrete policy areas with clear success criteria. The targeted poverty-alleviation program, for example, had as one of its major pillars the development of cooperative economies across the Chinese countryside.

In sum, the Chinese case demonstrates how alternative democratic formations — characterized in China as "whole-process people's democracy" — can generate legitimacy through different pathways than those valorized within liberal democracies. The principle of democratic centralism, combined with institutionalized popular participation in policy formulation processes, creates mechanisms for governmental responsiveness that transcend the periodic electoral cycles that constitute a ceiling on political engagement in capitalist societies.

The transformation of Minzhu Village — one of thousands of cases across China — provides a concrete illustration of how "whole-process people's democracy" operates as a reality for China's 1.4 billion people. The hundreds of courtyard meetings, the digitized mailbox collecting resident suggestions, and the comprehensive consultation process that guided the village's regeneration are a microcosm of broader mechanisms through which Chinese socialist democracy translates popular participation into material improvements in people's lives. This process, rooted in over a century of revolutionary experience and methodology, challenges fundamental assumptions about the relationship between democracy, development, and political legitimacy that have long dominated Western discourse — and reveals the superiority of socialist democracy, with its focus not only on political rights, but also on social and economic rights.

The Chinese model demonstrates that democracy need not be confined to periodic electoral exercises or formal procedural rights divorced from material conditions. "Whole-process people's democracy" integrates electoral and consultative mechanisms across multiple levels of governance, from village committees to the NPC, creating continuous channels for popular participation in decision-making processes. More importantly, it grounds democratic legitimacy in demonstrable improvements to people's material and social conditions — the elimination of absolute poverty, massive infrastructure development, technological advancement, and rising living standards achieved through processes that systematically incorporated popular input and oversight into policymaking.

This understanding of democracy as an expanding historical process rather than a fixed institutional arrangement reflects the broader methodological differences between historical materialist and liberal approaches to political analysis. Where liberal democracy treats existing Western institutional forms as the endpoint of democratic development, socialist democracy views democratic practice as continuously evolving in response to changing material conditions and popular needs. As Lin Shangli argues, there is a close interrelationship between democracy and development: “Democracy is both a precondition for modernization and one of its essential missions; it serves as both an instrument for progress as well as an objective in the modernization drive.”36 The Chinese experience suggests that this dialectical approach — one that prioritizes substance over form and results over procedures — may offer more robust foundations for genuine popular sovereignty than systems that formalize political equality while tolerating vast economic disparities that undermine meaningful democratic participation.

More fundamentally, the Chinese experience demonstrates the  of socialist construction and democracy. As Victor Gao observes:37

The implications extend beyond China's borders. In an era when Western liberal democracies face mounting crises of legitimacy — declining voter participation, growing inequality, institutional dysfunction, rising popular alienation from political processes, and the discarding of liberal democratic norms by states increasingly embroiled in wars of imperial expansion — the Chinese model offers alternative ways of conceptualizing the relationship between popular sovereignty and effective governance. It suggests that democracy's ultimate test lies not in conformity to particular institutional arrangements developed in specific historical contexts, but in its capacity to activate the people in shaping the conditions of their lives and societies. Understanding "whole-process people's democracy" therefore requires moving beyond the constraints imposed by liberal ideology to engage seriously with socialist approaches to political organization, which offer critical insights for all societies grappling with questions of development and popular sovereignty in the twenty-first century.
 

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